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Agricultural Contracts and Alternative
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The increasing use of agricultural contracts and processor concentration raises concerns that
processors may offer lower contract prices in absence of local competition. This study ex-
amines the price competitiveness of marketing and production contracts depending on the
availability of alternative marketing options. A propensity score matching method is used to
compare prices using contract data from a farm-level national survey. The results show that
the absence of other contractors or spot markets in producers’ areas does not lead to statis-
tically significant price differences in agricultural contracts for most commodities, providing
evidence that most agricultural processors do not exercise market power by reducing prices
when other local buyers are not available.
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Some of the key trends in the industrialization
of U.S. agriculture include tighter supply
chains with greater concentration of production
on a decreasing number of farms, more vertical
coordination in the production and marketing
system, and significant concentration down-
stream from the farm (Ahearn, Korb, and
Banker, 2005). The increased use of agricul-
tural contracts is one of these significant
structural changes in organizing the production
and marketing of crop and livestock commod-
ities. For instance, in 2003 producers used
marketing and production contracts to market
39% of the value of U.S. agricultural pro-
duction, up from 28% in 1991 and 11% in 1969
(MacDonald and Korb, 2006). According to
United States Department of Agriculture statis-
tics, the concentration of the food manufactur-
ing industry has also been increasing with the
mean industry four-firm concentration ratio in-
creasing from 35% in 1982 to 46% in 1997. An
important policy question is whether the in-
creased concentration in the processing industry
and the increased use of agricultural contracts
are a desirable result of cost efficiencies in
production or the undesirable effect of market
power from theagribusiness processors (Ahearn,
Korb, and Banker, 2005).
Agricultural contracting is typically studied
using the principal-agent economic framework.
In this framework, using contracts instead of
spot markets can include improved risk man-
agement and reduce production and transaction
costs. Despite these benefits, the increased use
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contractors may exploit market power by de-
terring other contractors from entering a local
market, setting quality standards and timing of
input provisions for production contracts, or by
reducing the prices paid for agricultural com-
modities, especially when there is little com-
petition from other local buyers. MacDonald
et al. (2004) argue that there is little evidence
that contractors interact with each other or
control spot market prices. Yet contracting in
the livestock industry is particularly contro-
versial where a few meatpackers handle most
of the livestock purchases while quantities
sold on the spot markets continue to decrease.
In response to these concerns, Congress has
passed laws and considered proposals in an
effort to regulate livestock contracts and re-
quire mandatory price reporting.
The literature examining agricultural con-
tracts is relatively small mostly due to the fact
that data on commodity contracts are scarce.
Most empirical studies examining marketing
and production contracts have explained the
factors affecting the adoption of various types
of contracts (e.g., Davis and Gillespie, 2007;
Katchova and Miranda, 2004) or have made
comparisons between contract and independent
producers (e.g., Key, 2004, 2005; Wang and
Jaenicke, 2006; Xia and Sexton, 2004; Zhang
and Sexton, 2000). Many studies have exam-
ined market power in the processing industries,
finding that processors exercise market power
but the price distortions are small in magnitude.
These studies have typically estimated the new
empirical industrial organization structural
models with aggregate industry-level data (for
an overview see Sexton, 2000). However, be-
cause of the spatial nature of agricultural pro-
duction, transportation costs, and commodity
perishability, many farmers are restricted to
selling their production within their geographic
areas. Therefore, instead of examining com-
petition among the largest processors, this
study proposes a new approach to examine
price distortions due to processor concentra-
tion, where competition from local buyers such
as other contractors and spot markets play an
important role. In other words, this study ex-
amines agricultural contracting from a farmers’
perspective using farm-level data rather than
from a processing industry’s perspective sup-
ported by industry data.
The objective of this study is to examine
whether agricultural processors exercise market
power in price setting by testing for statistically
significant price differences in absence of com-
petition from other local buyers. The propensity
score matching method is used to compare
contract prices, after first matching contracts on
their propensity score to ensure comparisons of
contracts with similar characteristics. The em-
pirical models are estimated with contract data
for several crop and livestock commodities us-
ing a farm-level national, representative survey.
The analyses are conducted from a farmers’
perspective by examining agricultural contracts
andcomparing theirprice competitiveness based
on alternative marketing options available to
farmers. The main contribution of this study is
evaluating the consequences of increased pro-
cessor concentration on agricultural contract
prices using an innovative methodology of pro-
pensity score matching. The results reveal im-
portantinsights into the price competitiveness of
agricultural contracts and market power in price
setting exercised by commodity processors.
Propensity Score Matching Method
The propensity score matching method was
first suggested by Rosenbaum and Rubin
(1983). While this method has been extensively
used in other fields, this is one of the first
studies in agricultural economics to apply it to
study the price competitiveness of agricultural
contracts.1 The method is designed to estimate
the average effects of a program, treatment, or
regime, between treated and control units.
When data come from observational studies as
opposed to experimental studies, the assign-
ment of units to treated and control groups is
not random, and therefore the estimation of the
1Only three other agricultural economics studies
were found that used the propensity score matching
method to examine farmland price differences (Lynch,
Gray, and Geoghegan, 2005), food aid (Gilligan and
Hoddinott, 2007), and credit constraints (Briggeman,
Towe, and Morehart, 2009).
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existence of confounding factors. The pro-
pensity score matching method reduces the bias
in comparisons between the treated and control
groups. This is accomplished by comparing
outcomes for treated andcontrolunits that are as
similar as possible. Treated and control groups
are matched to eliminate the effects of the
confounding factors. Because it is infeasible
to match units based on a multidimensional
vector of characteristics, these characteristics
are summarized using a single-index variable,
called a propensity score. After the propensity
scoreiscalculated,theunitsfromthetreatedand
control groups are matched based on their pro-
pensity score inorderto comparethedifferences
in outcomes between the two groups.
The goal is to estimate the difference be-
tween the prices received for agricultural con-
tracts that have competition from other local
buyers (the treated group) and those that do not
(the control group), accounting for the effects of
exogenous factors influencing the assignment of
contracts into one of these two groups. In order
to evaluate the effects of the availability of al-
ternative marketing options on contract prices,
all analyses are conducted with data at the con-
tract level for various commodities. For each
commodity, we observe n contracts, indexed by
i5 1...n. In our context, the outcomevariable Y
is the price received for an agricultural contract
of a particular commodity, and the treatment D
is whether the farmer has alternative marketing
options through other local buyers. The survey
questionconsidered two categoriesofother local
buyers: other contractors and spot markets. The
treatment D is defined as a binary variable,
where D 5 1 for farmers having other local
contractors and D 5 0 for farmers who do not
have other local contractors in their areas. The
analysis is then repeated with spot markets in-
stead of other contractors, with D 5 1f o r
farmers with spot markets in their areas and D 5
0 for farmers without local spot markets. The
third analysis combines the two categories with
D51 for farmerswitheither local contractors or
spot markets in their areas and D5 0f o rf a r m e r s
without any alternative marketing options.
For each agricultural contract for a particu-
lar commodity (representing unit i), Yi
T is the
price received when other local buyers are
present (the outcome under active treatment)
and Yi
C is the price received when other local
processors are not available (the outcome under
control treatment). For any agricultural con-
tract, only one of these outcomes is observed,
therefore each contract is uniquely assigned
into either the treated group (T) or the control
group (C). In addition, each contract has
a vector of characteristics (i.e., covariates,
pretreatment, or exogenous variables) denoted
by Xi. These characteristics represent variables
that are likely to influence the outcome (price),
such as a geographic location and farm and
contract characteristics.







The propensity score is defined by Rosenbaum
and Rubin (1983) to be the conditional proba-
bility of receiving treatment given pretreatment
characteristics,
(2) pðXÞ5Pr D51jX ðÞ 5EðDjXÞ.
This propensity score is used to match treated
and control units in order to estimate the dif-
ference in outcomes, also known as the Aver-
age Treatment Effect on the Treated (ATT):
(3)
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More specifically, the ATT is the difference
between two terms with the first term being the
outcome for the treated group which is ob-
servable and the second term being the out-
come for the treated group had it not been
treated, representing a counterfactual situation
which is unobservable and needs to be esti-
mated. Here, we are interested in the difference
between the prices for contracts with alterna-
tive marketing options and the prices they
would have received have they not had alter-
native marketing options.
The propensity score p(Xi) is used to match
treated and control units as closely as possible
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probabilityoftwounitshavingexactlythesame
propensity score is zero, since the propensity
score is a continuous variable. Various match-
ing methods have been suggested to overcome
this problem. The kernel matching and nearest
neighbormatchingmethodsareusedinthisstudy
tomatchtreatedandcontrolunitsandtocheckif
the results are robust with respect to different
matching methods. The two matching methods
offertradeoffbetweenquantityandqualityofthe
matches and none of them is a priori superior to
the other (Becker and Ichino, 2002).
With kernel matching, each treated observa-
tion is matched with a weighted average of all
controls with weights that are inversely pro-
portional to the distance between the propensity
scores of the treated and control units. The dif-
ference between the outcomes for the treated
andcontrolunits,ATT
























T is the number of treated units, pi is
the propensity score of unit i, G( ) is a kernel
function, and hn is a bandwidth parameter. In
this study, the default bandwidth parameter is
used so all controls are used as matches.
With nearestneighbormatching, each treated
unit i is matched with one control unit j that has
the closest propensity score. The nearest neigh-
bor matching set of control units is given by:
(5) CðiÞ5min
j
pi   pj
       .
The method is applied with replacement (i.e.,
a particular control unit can be a best match for
several treatment units). After matching treated
and control units, the difference between the
outcome of the treated units and outcome of the
matched control units, ATT

















where theweights wij 5 1i fj 2 C(i) and wij 5 0
otherwise. There is no bandwidth imposed for
this matching method.
The quality of the matches can also be im-
proved by imposing a common support re-
striction, when control units are included in
the analysis only when their propensity scores
fall within the range of propensity scores for
the treated units. A drawback of the common
support is that high quality matches near the
boundaries of common support may be lost and
the sample size may be considerably reduced.
Analyses withand without common supportare
used to test for the sensitivity of results. The
results reported in the results section do not use
the common support restriction.
Two key assumptions are employed by the
propensity score matching method. The uncon-
foundedness assumption states that if the as-
signment to treatment is unconfounded, that is,
(7) YT,YC ?DjX,
then the assignment to treatment is uncon-
founded given the propensity score, that is,
(8) YT,YC ?DjpðXÞ.
Put differently, the unconfoundedness assump-
tion asserts that characteristics that may affect
the outcomes are observable and included in the
model. This is an implicit assumption used in
the estimation of all economic models.
If the conditional independence assumption
holds, Y
C, the outcome for the controls (D 5 0),
can be assigned to the corresponding treated ob-
servations (D 5 1) as their unobserved counter-
factuals using certain matching techniques. The
weakerconditionalindependenceassumptionuses
(9)
EðYC D51,XÞ5EðYC D50, XÞ, j
   
PðD51 XÞ2ð 0,1Þ j
to estimate the average treatment effect. This as-
sumption is commonly used in the econometrics
literature (Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd, 1998).
The propensity score matching method
has two major advantages. First, the method
compares prices for contracts with similar
2Balancing tests are conducted to test for the
equality of means for the conditional variables for
the treated and control units. Stata tests were used for
the balancing property before the matching procedure
by dividing the sample into strata with similar condi-
tional variables. To the extent that some of the matches
may come from different strata, the results may be
biased.
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propensity scores. Second, unlike the traditional
Heckman approach, the propensity score
matchingisasemiparametricapproachwithstep
one being a parametric estimation of the pro-
pensityscoreandsteptwobeinganonparametric
estimation of the ATT price differences and
therefore it does not assume a particular func-
tional form for the price variable. Price compar-
isons for treated and control contracts are first
analyzed using simplet-testswithoutcontrolling
for exogenous factors. Then propensity score
matching models are estimated, after matching
contracts on their propensity scores.
Data and Simple Comparisons
Data are obtained from the Agricultural Re-
source Management Survey (ARMS), which is
conducted annually by the U.S. Department of
Agriculture. The ARMS data include detailed
information on marketing and production con-
tracts used by farmers to sell their crop and
livestock commodities. Farmers identified the
price, quantity, and value for each commodity
sold with marketing or production contracts.
The main version (version 1) of the survey also
includes more detailed questions about the
specifications of the contracts such as the
quantity and pricing mechanisms, and charac-
teristics of the contractors. Respondents also
reported whether they had alternative market-
ing options, including whether there were other
contractors in their areas (these questions were
asked in the survey years 2003–2005) and spot
markets (data available for 2004–2005).3,4 The
question about the spot market availability was
not included in 2003. Therefore, due to data
availability, the analyses are conducted with
ARMS data for 2003–2005 for the first analysis
based on the availability of other contractors
and for 2004–2005 for the second and third
analysis based on the availability of spot mar-
kets and other alternative marketing options
(either contractors or spot markets). The
ARMS data also include survey weights in-
dicating the number of farms in the United
States that each farm in the survey sample
represents. All estimations are weighted so that
the results are representative of all marketing
and production contracts used by U.S. pro-
ducers. The standard errors account for the
sampling weights using the bootstrap method.
Several commodities are considered de-
pending on whether there were a sufficient
number of contracts in the data to support the
estimations. The criteria for inclusion were
commodities that had at least 200 contracts in
the data set over the 3 years (2003–2005) and
that the contracts were of the same type (pro-
duction or marketing) and the same measure-
ment unit for the quantity marketed. Based on
data availability, the study includes marketing
contracts for corn for grain, soybeans, winter
wheat, upland cotton, and milk and production
contracts for broilers.
Table 1 shows the number of contracts in-
cluded in the ARMS data for each commodity,
the number of ‘‘treated’’ contracts with alter-
native marketing options (other contractors or
spot markets), the number of ‘‘control’’ con-
tracts without alternative marketing options,
and the proportion of contracts with alternative
marketing options. There are over a thousand
contracts in the sample reported for corn, soy-
beans, milk, and broilers for 2003–2005. The
availability of alternative marketing options
differs based on the commodities farmers pro-
duce. Most farmers producing crops have both
other local contractors and local spot markets.
About two-thirds of the marketing contracts for
corn, soybeans, wheat, and cotton were located
in areas with other contractors, and even higher
proportion of these contracts (about 83–95%)
had local spot markets. About 77% of milk
marketing contracts had other local contractors,
3The survey question asked producers, ‘‘If you had
not had this contract, what other marketing options
would you have had in your area for marketing this
commodity?’’ Four codes were provided as answers:
(1) none, (2) both cash sales and other contractors, (3)
only cash sales, and (4) only other contractors. These
four codes were regrouped into contracts having other
local contractors versusthose that do not, and contracts
having local spot markets versus those that do not.
4A reviewer pointed out that there may be a self-
selection bias associated with farmer’s ability and
information to find other contractors or spot markets.
These unobservable characteristics as well as infor-
mation about the characteristics of the local markets
are not controlled for due to data limitations.
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half of the contracts for broilers were located in
areas with other contractors, while only 3% of
them had local spot markets. Because poultry
producers have almost nonexistent spot mar-
kets, comparisons based on the availability of
local spot markets are not done for this
commodity.
Before applying the propensity score
matching approach, simple t-tests are used to
compare contract prices for the treated group of
contracts with alternative marketing options
and the control group of contracts without other
local buyers. In order to eliminate the effects
of price outliers, contract prices for each
commodity are censored at the 1st and 99th
percentiles. The qualitative results are similar
without price censoring.
Table 2 shows for each of the commodities
the average price for all contracts, the average
prices for the treated and control groups of
contracts, the price differences between the two
groups, the price differences expressed as
a percent of the average price for all contracts,
and t-tests for the significance of these price
differences. The simple t-tests show that most
commodities do not have statistically signifi-
cant contract price differences depending on the
availability of alternative marketing options.
Significant differences at the 5% level are found
forcorn contracts,whichhave 3.8%higherprices
when there are other local buyers. These simple
























Contracts with versus without Other Local Contractorsd
Corn Marketing 236,964 1,154 800 354 66%
Soybeans Marketing 181,650 1,151 802 349 65%
Wheat Marketing 27,722 281 197 84 69%
Cotton Marketing 23,056 342 238 104 71%
Milk Marketing 75,398 1,194 882 312 77%
Broilers Production 45,961 1,264 561 703 49%
Contracts with versus without Local Spot Marketsd
Corn Marketing 186,133 889 827 62 95%
Soybeans Marketing 139,859 866 795 71 88%
Wheat Marketing 21,691 205 184 21 89%
Cotton Marketing 21,261 303 237 66 83%
Milk Marketing 52,834 884 241 643 23%
Broilers Production 30,130 910 28 882 3%
Contracts with versus without Alternative Marketing Optionsd
Corn Marketing 186,133 889 851 38 98%
Soybeans Marketing 139,859 866 815 51 91%
Wheat Marketing 21,691 205 191 14 92%
Cotton Marketing 21,261 303 277 26 93%
Milk Marketing 52,834 884 676 208 78%
Broilers Production 30,130 910 333 577 39%
a The ARMS data include survey weights to make contracts in the sample representative of all agricultural contracts in the
United States.
b Treated contracts are contracts with local contractors/spot markets.
c Control contracts are contracts without other contractors/spot markets.
d Because of data availability, the top part of the table include data for 2003–2005 and the bottom two parts include data for
2004–2005.
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without alternative marketing options provide
evidence that most contractors do not exercise
market power by offering lower contract pricesin
absence of competition from other local buyers.
The results from the simple t-tests may be
biased because the assignment of contracts into
the treated group (with other local buyers) and
the control group is not random. If confounding
factors, such as the geographic location and
farm and contract characteristics, affect both
the contract’s propensity for having alternative
marketing options and contract prices, then
such factors need to be incorporated in the
analysis before contract prices are compared.
Several factors are hypothesized to affect the
contract’s probability of having alternative
marketing options and/or contract prices. The
geographic region where the farm is located
and the year the commodity is marketed may
determine the availability of access to other
buyers as well as the prices received for the
commodities. Five regions are considered: the
South,chosen as thereference dummyvariable,
the Midwest, the Plains, the West, and the At-
lantic region. Indicator variables for different
years are also included in the models. Contract
characteristics such as the quantity marketed
with each contract, whether the contract spec-
ified premiums tied to commodity attributes,
contract length, and whether the contractor is
a cooperative or a privately owned processor
may affect access to markets and contract pri-
ces. Finally, farm characteristics such as farm
size and farmer age and education are included
in the models. Descriptive statistics of these
conditioning variables are provided in Table 3.
Propensity Score Matching Results
The propensity score matching methodology
involves a two-step estimation. The first step


















Contracts with versus without Other Local Contractors
Corn Bushel 2.46 2.50 2.40 0.09 3.8% 2.49
Soybeans Bushel 6.46 6.44 6.51 20.07 21.1% 20.73
Wheat Bushel 3.43 3.43 3.42 0.01 0.2% 0.09
Cotton Pound 0.54 0.55 0.52 0.02 3.8% 0.74
Milk Cwt 14.57 14.62 14.41 0.20 1.4% 0.49
Broilers Head 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.00 21.3% 20.50
Contracts with versus without Local Spot Markets
Corn Bushel 2.49 2.50 2.32 0.18 7.4% 1.87
Soybeans Bushel 6.56 6.54 6.72 20.18 22.8% 21.30
Wheat Bushel 3.44 3.46 3.30 0.16 4.6% 1.84
Cotton Pound 0.53 0.53 0.56 20.03 26.0% 21.44
Milk Cwt 15.44 15.35 15.46 20.11 20.7% 20.34
Contracts with versus without Alternative Marketing Options
Corn Bushel 2.49 2.49 2.41 0.09 3.4% 1.14
Soybeans Bushel 6.56 6.55 6.59 20.04 20.6% 21.39
Wheat Bushel 3.44 3.44 3.40 0.04 1.2% 0.64
Cotton Pound 0.53 0.53 0.54 20.01 22.4% 20.61
Milk Cwt 15.44 15.56 14.62 0.94 6.1% 1.68
Broilers Head 0.26 0.27 0.26 0.01 1.5% 0.61
a Treated contracts are contracts with local contractors/spot markets.
b Control contracts are contracts without other contractors/spot markets.
c Percent price differences are price differences between the treated and control groups as a percent of the average prices for each
commodity.
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, May 2010 268is to estimate a probit model for the contract’s
propensity to have alternative marketing op-
tions depending on contract and farm charac-
teristics. The predicted probabilities from the
probit model, also called propensity scores, are
used to match each treated contract (with al-
ternative marketing options) to one or more
control contracts (without alternative market-
ing options). Two matching techniques are
used: kernel matching and nearest neighbor
matching. The second step is to estimate the
ATT (average treatment effect on the treated)
price differences between treated and control
contracts. T-tests are used to conclude if these
differences are statistically significant.
The first step of the propensity score
matching models is to estimate a probit model
for the propensity of a contract to have other
local buyers based on contract and farm char-
acteristics. The overall results and conclusions
turned out to be robust with respect to several
alternative specifications of the propensity
score models. Table 4 presents the results from
the propensity score models. Probit models are
estimated for each of the six commodities (the
columns in the Table 4). The dependent vari-
able is whether or not contracts are located in
areas with other local contractors in the first
part of the table. In the second part of the table,
the dependent variable is whether or not con-
tracts are located in areas with local spot mar-
kets, and in the third part of the table, the
analysis is based on whether contracts have
either contractors or spot markets or neither of
these options. The independent variables, de-
scribed in the previous paragraph, are expected
to affect the propensity of a contract to have
alternative marketing options. The probit
model results show some important differences
between contracts with and without local com-
petition. For instance, in comparison with the
South, the Midwest and Atlantic regions are
more likely to have other contractors for milk,
whereas the Atlantic region is less likely to
have other contractors for soybeans. The Mid-
west is also more likely to have spot markets
forcorn and milk incomparison with theSouth.
The changes from year to year in local market
concentration are also taken into account. Not
all time dummy variables for every commodity
are significant, but the ones that are significant
are usually negative, indicating a trend toward
less availability of other local contractors over
time. In other words, this study confirms the
trend of an increasing consolidation of con-
tractors. Contract characteristics such as con-
tract quantity, premiums tied to commodity
attributes to reflect grower’s effort, contract
length, and type of contractor also affect the
access to other local buyers for some com-
modities. If contracts pay price premiums as-
sociated with quality, wheat and cotton farmers
are less likely to have other contractors in the
area, while milk farmers are more likely to
have other contractors and less likely to have
spot markets in the area. The models are able to
predict correctly 64–96% of the outcomes in-
dicating an acceptable goodness of fit. Esti-
mated coefficients and independent variables
from the probit models are used to calculate
a propensity score (the predicted probability
from the probit model) for each contract to
have alternative marketing options.
Each treated contract (with alternative mar-
keting options) is matched to one or more con-
trol contracts (without alternative marketing
options) using kernel matching or nearest neigh-
bor matching. With kernel matching, each
treated contract is matched with a weighted av-
erage of all control contracts with weights that
are inversely proportional to the distance be-
tween the propensity scores of the treated and
control contracts. With nearest neighbor match-
ing, each treated contract is matched with one
control contract that has the closest propensity
score. After establishing a group of control
contracts with as similar as possible propensity
scores to thetreated contracts, the contract prices
in the two groups can be statistically compared.
The second step of the propensity score
matching analysis involves estimating the av-
erage treatment effects on the treated (ATT),
calculated as the difference between the con-
tract prices for the treated group (with alter-
native marketing options) and the prices for the
control group of contracts without alternative
marketing options but with similar propensity
scores of having other local buyers. Table 5
presents the results from the ATT price com-
parisons using kernel matching and nearest
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Corn Soybeans Wheat Cotton Milk Broilers
Contracts with versus without Other Local Contractors
Contract Quantity 23.E-07 22.E-06 3.E-06 1.E-07 2.E-06* 24.E-08
(2.E-06) (5.E-06) (6.E-06) (2.E-07) (8.E-07) (1.E-07)
Contract Premiums 20.022 20.328 20.903** 20.661* 0.443* 0.257
(0.204) (0.200) (0.350) (0.262) (0.184) (0.164)
Contract Length 20.016 0.022 0.029 20.045 0.006 20.005**
(0.019) (0.023) (0.034) (0.030) (0.007) (0.002)
Cooperative 0.096 0.191 20.391 0.160 20.324 20.449*
(0.169) (0.189) (0.344) (0.308) (0.228) (0.207)
Farm Assets 2.E-07** 1.E-07* 1.E-07 5.E-08 2.E-09 1.E-07
(6.E-08) (5.E-08) (9.E-08) (7.E-08) (1.E-08) (6.E-08)
Operator Age 20.010 20.016* 20.017 20.011 0.008 20.006
(0.006) (0.007) (0.011) (0.011) (0.009) (0.005)
Operator Education 20.140 0.099 20.386 0.384 0.191 0.034
(0.097) (0.107) (0.202) (0.221) (0.119) (0.056)
Midwest Region 0.102 20.110 0.584 20.358 1.063** 0.237
(0.250) (0.175) (0.413) (1.057) (0.279) (0.415)
Plains Region 0.058 20.141 0.621 20.183 0.241 20.121
(0.293) (0.277) (0.433) (0.354) (0.330) (0.190)
West Region 0.007 0.096 0.427 0.311 20.413
(0.560) (0.465) (0.384) (0.239) (0.406)
Atlantic Region 0.270 20.398* 20.119 0.255 0.878** 0.086
(0.299) (0.203) (0.412) (0.525) (0.230) (0.124)
Year 2004 20.714** 21.244** 20.418 20.487 20.603** 20.900**
(0.239) (0.229) (0.308) (0.455) (0.223) (0.139)
Year 2005 20.851** 21.107** 20.855** 20.444 20.308 20.752**
(0.257) (0.214) (0.318) (0.460) (0.199) (0.210)
Constant 1.642** 1.848** 2.697** 1.071 20.623 0.663
(0.548) (0.533) (0.992) (0.933) (0.610) (0.381)
Observations 1154 1151 281 342 1194 1263
Log Likelihood 2680 2657 2143 2176 2586 2790
Chi Square
Statistic
29 58 37 21 54 68
P-value 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.00
R Square 0.08 0.12 0.17 0.15 0.09 0.10
Percent Correctly
Predicted
0.69 0.70 0.73 0.70 0.74 0.66
Corn Soybeans Wheat Cotton Milk
Contracts with versus without Local Spot Markets
Contract Quantity 21.E-07 23.E-06 6.E-06 5.E-07* 24.E-07
(3.E-06) (6.E-06) (1.E-05) (2.E-07) (7.E-07)
Contract Premiums 20.083 0.445 0.113 20.421 20.359*
(0.299) (0.351) (0.367) (0.292) (0.178)
Contract Length 0.039 0.120* 20.049 0.012 20.002
(0.035) (0.049) (0.041) (0.024) (0.010)
Cooperative 1.240** 0.021 20.610 0.268 20.257
(0.248) (0.315) (0.463) (0.258) (0.262)
Farm Assets 22.E-09 3.E-08 2.E-08 24.E-08 2.E-08
(5.E-08) (7.E-08) (1.E-07) (5.E-08) (1.E-08)
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Corn Soybeans Wheat Cotton Milk
Contracts with versus without Local Spot Markets
Operator Age 20.025 20.031** 0.017 0.031** 20.014
(0.013) (0.011) (0.014) (0.011) (0.009)
Operator Education 20.098 0.084 0.872* 20.303* 0.302**
(0.132) (0.148) (0.420) (0.152) (0.097)
Midwest Region 0.870** 0.119 0.223 0.855*
(0.300) (0.269) (0.545) (0.400)
Plains Region 0.399 20.202 1.024 0.452 20.148
(0.360) (0.402) (0.603) (0.325) (0.440)
West Region 0.007 20.034 0.030
(0.637) (0.388) (0.345)
Atlantic Region 0.574 0.348 20.150 0.504 20.226
(0.435) (0.308) (0.579) (0.416) (0.357)
Year 2005 0.359 0.424 0.704* 20.519 20.048
(0.320) (0.301) (0.314) (0.328) (0.222)
Constant 1.939* 1.764 21.795 20.048 20.367
(0.868) (0.916) (1.362) (0.760) (0.673)
Observations 880 866 205 295 884
Log Likelihood 2129 2251 253 2109 2388
Chi Square
Statistic
67 42 20 33 52
P-value 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.00
R Square 0.23 0.20 0.25 0.21 0.18
Percent Correctly
Predicted
0.93 0.92 0.90 0.77 0.78
Corn Soybeans Wheat Cotton Milk Broilers
Contracts with versus without Alternative Marketing Options
Contract Quantity 4.E-07 29.E-07 1.E-05 2.E-07 1.E-06 4.E-09
(3.E-06) (6.E-06) (1.E-05) (2.E-07) (1.E-06) (1.E-09)
Contract Premiums 0.057 0.501 20.057 20.743** 0.418* 20.031
(0.331) (0.347) (0.336) (0.352) (0.249) (0.163)
Contract Length 0.027 0.119* 0.024 0.019 20.287 20.001
(0.0466) (0.061) (0.042) (0.029) (0.302) (0.003)
Cooperative 0.751** 0.095 20.956* 20.146 20.287 20.265
(0.231) (0.341) (0.521) (0.317) (0.302) (0.239)
Farm Assets 22.E-09 24.E-09 2.E-07 24.E-08 3.E-08 1.E-07**
(4.E-08) (7.E-08) (2.E-07) (5.E-08) (3.E-08) (6.E-08)
Operator Age 20.016 20.017* 0.014 0.035** 0.014 20.009
(0.016) (0.011) (0.016) (0.012) (0.010) (0.006)
Operator Education 0.099 0.413** 1.053** 20.161 0.364** 20.028
(0.107) (0.151) (0.425) (0.175) (0.155) (0.071)
Midwest Region 0.740** 0.095 0.732 1.554** 0.723*
(0.343) (0.298) (0.484) (0.325) (0.370)
Plains Region 0.904* 0.277 1.360** 0.375 0.064 0.125
(0.464) (0.516) (0.686) (0.381) (0.392) (0.224)
West Region 20.272 0.918* 0.363 20.627
(0.678) (0.476) (0.263) (0.552)
Katchova: Agricultural Contracts and Alternative Marketing Options 271neighbor matching procedures. The top portion
of the table compares contracts with and
without other local contractors, the middle
portion compares contracts with versus without
local spot markets, and the bottom part com-
pares contracts with versus without alternative
marketing options (of either kind). The table
shows the number of all treated contracts, the
number of control contracts that are used as
matches for the treated contracts, ATT price
differences, ATT price differences expressed as
a percent of the average prices, and t-statistics
for the price comparisons. Kernel matching
uses all of the control contracts, whereas the
nearest neighbor matching procedure only uses
a subset of these contracts that have the closest
propensity scores to the treated contracts.
The ATT price differences in Table 5 are
measured in dollars and are also expressed as
a percent of the average contract price for all
contracts and the confidence intervals are pro-
vided. The estimated ATT percent price dif-
ferences are relatively small in magnitude (less
than 4.2% of the average commodity price)
and not statistically significant except for two
commodities. Cotton contracts tend to receive
significantly higher prices if located in areas
with other contractors. The ATT price differ-
ence for cotton is 3.5% of the average price
using both matching methods and significant at
the 5% and 10% levels using the kernel and
nearest matching methods, respectively. These
results suggest that cotton processors may be
exercising market power by offering lower
prices on contracts when there are no other
local contractors present.
Corn contracts located near spot markets re-
ceive 3.9% higher prices than comparable corn
contracts without access to spot markets, and this
differenceissignificantatthe5%levelusingboth
matching methods. Spot markets for corn are the
mostprevalentmarketsamongcommodities,with
95% of farmers having access to spot markets in
addition to contracting in their areas. Therefore,
corn producers with weaker bargaining positions
who do not have alternative marketing options at
harvest may be willing to enter contracts with
lowerprices.Wheneitherlocalcontractorsorspot
markets are available, none of the differences are
statisticallysignificantfromthecontractswithout
alternative marketing options.
Because most of the results in this study
show lackofstatisticallysignificantdifferences,
the statistical power of the test is calculated.
The power of a test shows the probability that
a test will correctly identify significant differ-
ences when such significant differences exist.
Here, the probabilities are calculated given
the sample sizes and price variability for dif-
ferent commodities and several percent price
differences as effect sizes. The probability to
correctly detect statistically significant price
differences of 3% is greater than 0.9 for corn,
soybeans, and milk and to detect statistically
Table 4. Continued
Corn Soybeans Wheat Cotton Milk Broilers
Contracts with versus without Alternative Marketing Options
Atlantic Region 1.377** 0.386 0.737 20.043 0.845** 0.265**
(0.413) (0.343) (0.681) (0.438) (0.267) (0.132)
Year 2005 20.005 0.225 20.309* 0.200 0.289 0.093
(0.372) (0.312) (0.368) (0.392) (0.319) (0.171)
Constant 1.504* 0.485 21.861 0.035 21.771** 20.011
(0.786) (0.829) (1.586) (0.808) (0.789) (0.359)
Observations 880 866 205 295 884 909
Log Likelihood 275 2204 233 258 2398 2590
Chi Square Statistic 36 37 15 25 57 18
P-value 0.00 0.00 0.23 0.009 0.00 0.11
R Square 0.13 0.20 0.36 0.26 0.14 0.03
Percent Correctly Predicted 0.96 0.94 0.93 0.91 0.77 0.64
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses.
Single and double asterisks denote significance level of 0.10 and 0.05, respectively.
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than 0.9 for cotton and broilers and greater than
0.8forwheat.Inotherwords,thetestshereshow
sufficient power to detect statistically significant
price differences above 3–5% depending on the
sample sizes of different commodities. As
reported earlier, the tests were able to detect
a statistically significant difference of 3.9% for























Contracts with versus without Other Local Contractors
Corn Kernel 800 354 20.037 23.5%, 0.5% 21.5% 21.46
NN 800 256 20.018 22.7%, 1.2% 20.7% 20.74
Soybeans Kernel 802 349 20.004 21.8%, 1.7% 20.1% 20.07
NN 802 257 20.028 22.9%, 2.1% 20.4% 20.34
Wheat Kernel 197 84 0.059 21.8%, 5.2% 1.7% 0.96
NN 197 60 0.013 23.5%, 4.3% 0.4% 0.19
Cotton Kernel 238 104 0.019 0.2%, 6.9% 3.5% 2.07
NN 238 81 0.019 20.3%, 7.3% 3.5% 1.82
Milk Kernel 882 312 20.096 22.5%, 1.1% 20.7% 20.72
NN 882 233 20.134 23.3%, 1.4% 20.9% 20.77
Broilers Kernel 561 703 0.003 21.3%, 3.6% 1.2% 0.93
NN 561 312 0.003 23.1%, 5.4% 1.2% 0.53
Contracts with versus without Local Spot Markets
Corn Kernel 827 62 0.097 0.7%, 7.1% 3.9% 2.39
NN 827 62 0.098 0.2%, 7.7% 3.9% 2.05
Soybeans Kernel 795 71 0.135 20.7%, 4.8% 2.1% 1.46
NN 795 71 0.164 20.6%, 5.6% 2.5% 1.56
Wheat Kernel 184 21 0.077 25.7%, 10.2% 2.2% 0.55
NN 184 18 20.133 215.5%, 7.8% 23.9% 20.65
Cotton Kernel 237 66 0.009 22.5%, 5.9% 1.7% 0.80
NN 237 57 0.001 26.0%, 6.4% 0.2% 0.06
Milk Kernel 241 643 20.478 27.0%, 0.8% 23.1% 21.55
NN 241 152 20.436 29.9%, 4.3% 22.8% 20.78
Contracts with versus without Alternative Marketing Options
Corn Kernel 851 38 0.043 22.4%, 5.8% 1.7% 0.83
NN 851 38 20.007 25.3%, 4.7% 20.3% 20.11
Soybeans Kernel 815 51 0.019 22.9%, 3.4% 0.3% 0.18
NN 815 50 0.122 21.9%, 5.6% 1.9% 0.98
Wheat Kernel 191 14 20.021 213.9%, 12.7% 20.6% 20.09
NN 191 14 20.128 218.3%, 10.9% 23.7% 20.50
Cotton Kernel 277 26 0.022 20.1%, 8.4% 4.2% 1.90
NN 277 25 0.007 22.3%, 5.0% 1.3% 0.71
Milk Kernel 676 208 0.095 21.2%, 2.5% 0.6% 0.65
NN 676 170 0.082 21.5%, 2.6% 0.5% 0.51
Broilers Kernel 333 577 20.001 23.0%, 2.2% 20.4% 20.29
NN 333 222 0.001 25.4%, 6.2% 0.4% 0.13
a Matching methods include kernel matching and nearest neighbor (NN) matching.
b Number of contracts with other local contractors/spot markets.
c Number of contracts without other contractors/spot markets that are used as matches for the treated contracts.
d ATT (Average Treatment Effect on Treated) price differences for contracts with and without other local buyers, after matching
contracts on their propensity scores.
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did not.
In summary, the findings show that only
a couple of commodities (corn and cotton) have
statisticaldifferencesincommoditypricesabove
3–5% that the tests have statistical power to de-
tect. Cotton growers receive prices that are 3.5%
higher if other local contractors are present and
corn growers receive prices that are 3.9% higher
if there are local spot markets and these differ-
ences are statistically significant. The rest of the
commodities have estimated price differences
that are smaller than the 3–5% level needed to
detect statistical significance based onthe power
of the tests. Overall, the results show lack of
statistically significant price distortions exceed-
ing 4–5% in agricultural contracts depending on
the availability of alternative marketing options.
Several sensitivity analyses are conducted
to ensure robustness of the results. Similar over-
all results are found for different comparison
methods (simple t-tests and propensity score
matchinganalysis),matchingtechniques(kernel
matching and nearest neighbor matching; with
and without the common support restriction
for the range of propensity scores of treated
and control contracts), data censoring (with and
withoutprice outliers),aggregationlevels (atthe
contract level, using clusters for contracts be-
longing to the same farm, or averaging contract
characteristics at the farm level), alternative cat-
egories (other contractors and spot markets in
two categories or combined into one category),
reversing of the treated and control groups, and
alternative specifications of the propensity score
models. Therefore, the findings are robust to
alternative specifications of the models.
Conclusions and Policy Implications
This study examines the price competitiveness
of agricultural contracts depending on the
availability of alternative marketing options.
Specifically,prices for marketingandproduction
contracts are compared for farmers located in
areas where other contractors and spot markets
are present with prices that farmers would have
received in absence of competition from other
local buyers. This study addresses the important
question of whether processors exercise market
power by testing if prices on comparable agri-
cultural contracts are significantly lower when
other marketing channels are not available.
The propensity score matching method is
used to estimate price differences after match-
ing on the contract’s propensity to have alter-
native marketing options. The two-step method
includes estimating a propensity score as a first
step and then calculating the average treatment
effect on the treated using prices for contracts
with similar propensity scores. Contract data
for six commodities (corn, soybeans, wheat,
cotton, milk, and broilers) are obtained from
the Agricultural Resource Management Sur-
vey. The findings from the first-step models
show that the propensity for access to alterna-
tive marketing options depends on the geo-
graphic region, year, and contract and farm
characteristics. The second-step estimation re-
sults presenting the ATT price differences in-
dicate that only a couple of commodities have
statistical differences in commodity prices
above 3–5% that the tests have statistical power
to detect. Cotton growers receive 3.5% statisti-
cally significant higher prices if other local
contractors are present and corn growers receive
3.9% statistically significant higher prices if
there are local spot markets. The rest of the
commodities have estimated price differences
that are smaller than the 3–5% level needed to
detect statistical significance based on the power
of the tests. Overall, the results show lack of
statistically significant price distortions exceed-
ing 4–5% in agricultural contracts depending on
access to alternative marketing channels. These
findings are consistent with the explanation that
the upwardtrendincontract use is likely not due
to the exercise of price setting market power by
processors but may be due to other factors such
as increased efficiency associated with the ver-
tical coordination in the production and mar-
keting of agricultural commodities.
The increased use of contracting and pro-
cessor concentration represents key trends in
the industrialization of agriculture. For exam-
ple, commodities such as tobacco and hogs
moved rapidly toward more contracting over
the last decade. Contracts now dominate the
exchange of several commodities such as to-
bacco, cotton, rice, broilers, and hogs. Other
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continue to be sold predominantly on the spot
markets. This study provides evidence that the
absence of local spot markets does not lead to
lower contract prices for the commodities
considered in this study, except for corn which
has prevalent spot markets.
From a government policy perspective, the
shift away from spot markets toward contract-
ing facilitates the traceability of food and food
ingredients in the agri-food chain. The in-
creased vertical coordination in the production
and marketing of agricultural commodities is
typically associated with ensuring food safety
and delivering quality assurances to consumers,
especially when commodity attributes are not
easily observable.
The shift from spot markets to contracting
also raises concerns about whether spot mar-
kets will be a viable option in the future. As
more quantities are marketed with contracts,
the lower traded volume on the spot markets
may induce a tipping point where the thinness
and uncertainty of spot markets may force
independent producers to accept contracts
(MacDonald et al., 2004). This study shows
that the absence of spot markets does not lead
to lower commodity prices offered by the pro-
cessing industry, which means that additional
regulations regarding the increasing concen-
tration of processors may not be needed at this
time. Even so, government intervention is still
necessary to ensure that there is no loss in price
information because of contracting. The Con-
gress and the United States Department of
Agriculture have recently proposed to reau-
thorize the Livestock Mandatory Reporting Act
of 1999 to ensure transparency of commodity
prices when the sector undergoes structural
changes toward more contracting. Price trans-
parency is of crucial importance for farmers
since the consolidation in the processing in-
dustry may lead to a decreasing bargaining
power for producers.
Previous studies have examined market
power using the new empirical industrial or-
ganization structural models and aggregate
industry-level data and have concluded that the
processing industry is exercising market power
but it is small in magnitude (for overview see
Sexton, 2000). In contrast, this study used
farm-level contract data to examine imperfect
competition among local processors uniquely
from a farmers’ perspective by taking into
consideration the spatial nature of agricultural
production and marketing. Using different ap-
proach, models, and data, the findings here are
also consistent with the limited evidence for
market power in the processing industry found
in other studies. While the absence of local
competition from other buyers currently does
not lead to lower prices, the bargaining power
of farmers will likely continue to weaken as
more production shifts to contracting with
larger processors. Therefore, policy makers
need to monitor these structural changes in
agricultural contracting as more government
intervention may be needed in the future.
[Received November 2008; Accepted November 2009.]
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